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Abstract 
The last two decades have witnessed that countries across the world are guided by the rules 
and regulations of multilateral trading institutions (for example, World Trade organization 
[WTO], International Monetary Fund [IMF]) in order to promote free and fair trade through 
gradual reduction in trade barriers. The World economy has noticed significant reduction in 
tariffs, yet we find a rise in non-tariff barriers (NTBs). However, we still find dumping and 
few other trade strategies of the exporting countries as a major hindrance to free and fair 
trade. Such behaviour has led to “contingent protection” as a tool of new-protectionism.  
Among the contingent protection measures, anti-dumping (AD) has evolved as the most 
popular choice of strategy for the trading nations. The AD policy invokes a threat to the 
exporter and thereby can change its strategic behaviour. We describe the phenomenon of 
dumping through a price-leadership model and thereby compute the optimal level of anti-
dumping duty that can offset dumping. Using a sequential game, we conclude that the 
credible threat of an AD duty restricts dumping and thereby leads to a win-win situation for 
both the foreign and domestic firms.  
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1. Introduction 
The post-war period has witnessed significant growth of international trade which was mainly 
guided by the multifarious statues of the multilateral trading institutions (for example, The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], IMF, WTO, etc.). The major objectives of 
these organizations were to promote free and fair trade. One of such means was by gradually 
bringing down the tariff rates, abolishing quota and other trade restrictions. Initially, the 
emerging economies (e.g., India, Argentina, Brazil and South Africa, among a few others) 
were not in favour of accepting the new trade policies framed by these institutions. These 
economies were sceptical because exposing the domestic economy to international 
competition can create distortions in the form of material injury to the firms in the respective 
home country.
1
  In response to the divergence in trade policies of developed and developing 
countries, WTO [GATT (1948) and in subsequent rounds of deliberations] provided a 
platform for the harmonization of the same and thereby promoting world trade. One such 
policy measure was providing protection through „contingent protection‟. 
 
Contingent protection comprises of AD measures, Countervailing and Safeguard measures. 
AD duty is used by the importing country to offset the price advantage exploited by the 
foreign firms on their low priced exports. An AD initiation has two components: (i) a 
dumping component based on price discrimination (i.e., export price below the normal value) 
and (ii) the „material injury‟.2  Under the WTO rules [Uruguay Round (1994)], AD duty can 
only be applied if these two conditions are satisfied simultaneously. Countervailing measures 
on the other hand, help the domestic firms in offsetting the advantages that the foreign firms 
possess in terms of an export subsidy given by their respective home countries. Lastly, the 
safeguard measures allow a grace period to those importing countries whose domestic 
industries have lost comparative advantage due to the competition faced from huge imports. 
The intricate process of the safeguard and countervailing measures make them quite 
conservative in nature among the trading countries. On the contrary, AD procedures are 
flexible and gets over within a period of 18 months; moreover, it is case specific which is 
unlike the typical tariff policy. It is argued that AD has a unique combination of economic 
and political applicability (Prusa, 2001). On the other hand, Finger (1993), demonstrates that 
                                                          
1
 Material Injury to any industry means the actual or potential decline in sales, profit, output, market share, 
productivity, return on investment, etc. See, Article 3 of the AD agreement of GATT (1994) for details. 
2
 AD initiation refers to the legal procedural action taken by an importing country in order to investigate an 
imported product subsequently taken up by government authorities in both importing and exporting countries.  
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anti-dumping as practised today comprises largely of bad economics and power politics.
3
 
(See, Bekker, 2006, for similar arguments). AD law justifies the trade restriction it creates. 
Moreover, this law allows meagre firms to initiate AD cases, bring imports under scrutiny 
and thereby protect themselves from competition. Otherwise, the low priced exports can be 
countered with orthodox trade protectionist measures. 
 
The main theme of the paper is to explore whether the (credible) threat of an AD enforcement 
by the import competing domestic firm would alter the decision of foreign exporting firm 
with regard to selling below the „normal value‟.  
 
1.2 Anti-dumping  Its Popularity and Concerns 
Market distortions in the form of dumping signal price changes that over time lead to various 
market adjustments. If these disturbances are temporary, then there would be few 
adjustments. One such temporal adjustment is imposition of an anti-dumping duty. The 
emergence of new protectionism in the form of anti-dumping across the developing nations 
seems to be mostly concerned with safeguarding the domestic industries against these market 
distortions. Sometimes, nations use AD initiations as a threat to counter attack low priced 
exports or to protect their own sick industries.   
 
The dawn of the 21
st
 century marked the centennial year (2004) of the anti-dumping measures 
and also by this time it had become the (trade) policy choice for both developing and 
developed nations. Particularly, in the last two decades „new‟ AD users (comprising India, 
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa, among a few others) have outpaced the 
„traditional‟ AD users (U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the European Community) 
in terms of AD filings. In the immediate aftermath of the Uruguay Round, these „new‟ AD 
users had initiated AD complaints at an unprecedented rate. Compared to 1980s when only a 
handful of nations had anti-dumping codes, over 40 nations had joined the AD club in the 
1990s. 
 
The significant spurt in AD activities across the world over the period 1980-2011 has led to 
the dilemma of whether anti-dumping is actually a form of protection from genuine harmful 
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 Practitioners of anti-dumping laws have mechanized ways to convert initiations into measures. Turning down 
an anti-dumping initiation by the government allows the practisers to find another means to make the case into 
an affirmative one. 
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practices or is it just a modified form of a protectionist measure?
4
 Recent available data 
reveal that AD initiations constitute around 89 per cent of the total contingent protection 
measures all over the world and are significantly greater when average tariff rates across the 
globe have been declining (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Distribution of Various Contingent Protections, 1995 – 2011 
Data Source: WTO Reports on Anti-dumping, Safeguard and Countervailing Initiations 
 
Since the Uruguay Round till date, the WTO data specify India as the top users of AD. The 
first AD initiation of India was in 1992 against the U.S., Japan and Brazil for the product 
PVC resin. In particular during the period 1995-2011, India has filed 16 per cent of all global 
anti-dumping cases, quite disproportionate to its share in global imports (2.04% in 2010-11).
5
 
As the economy progressively opened up under the statutes of multilateral trading 
institutions, India‟s share in global AD activities has also increased.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 Prior to the 1980s there were less than 100 AD cases across the world; whereas, in the period between 1995 
and 2011 there were more than 250 cases on an average every year. 
5
 Authors‟ calculation based on 2010-11 data available in the WTO Statistics data base. 
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Figure 2: Anti-dumping Initiations and Degree of Openness in India 
 
Data Source: WTO Reports on AD Initiations; WTO Statistics Database and The World 
Development Indicators (World Bank). 
Note: India‟s Share in AD Initiations is defined as a ratio of India‟s AD Initiations to World AD Initiations. 
Degree of openness is calculated as a ratio of trade to GDP (in current year prices). 
 
Most of the products which face AD initiations and measures are products of chemical and 
allied industries, plastic and rubber articles, textiles, base metals, machinery and mechanical 
appliances. These industries alone initiated around 91 per cent of AD cases during the period 
1995-2011. Out of these initiations, around 61 per cent have been converted into measures. 
With so many initiations across India and other nations, there is a concern among scholars of 
whether anti-dumping has moved away from the original intentions that created it (i.e., 
protection from predatory dumping). We do not answer such questions in this paper.  
However, we believe that credible threat of AD enforcement would alter trade practices of 
the foreign (exporting) firm with respect to selling below the „normal value‟ and move 
towards free and fair trade. 
 
The itinerary of rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 focuses on the main theme of the 
paper. With the backdrop of a price leadership model, we argue whether threat of an AD duty 
on the foreign firm, can effectively eliminate exports below the „normal value‟. Alongside, we 
support the argument through a game theoretic exercise. Section 3 concludes the paper. 
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2. The Model 
 
 In this section we argue that the threat of an optimal ad-valorem AD duty would alter the 
pricing decision of the foreign firm. For similar arguments see, (Reitzes, 1993; Tivig and 
Walz, 2000). With this proposition, we take into account the sustained „material injury‟ to the 
domestic firm and thereby calculate the optimal duty required to offset dumping.  
 
We consider a duopoly model involving the domestic firm and a foreign firm, both producing 
„like product‟.6 The technologically superior foreign firm is the price leader. The foreign firm 
(Firm 1) exports 1q amount of output to the home country. It enjoys a cost advantage in 
production of 1q and can sell in the home (export) market below its „normal value‟. On the 
other hand, Firm 2 (the domestic firm) produces 2q amount of output and is assumed to be the 
single producer of the product in its home country. 
 
In the home market, both the firms face a linear market demand function bpaQ   0, ba .
7
  
Suppose that the cost functions for firm 1 and 2 are: 
1 1 1 1( ) ;  0c q q F     and 
2
2
2 2 2( )
2
q
c q F 
 
1F and 2F denote fixed costs for firm 1 and 2, respectively.  Total market output is 1 2Q q q  .  
The profit-maximization problem for the domestic firm (Firm 2) in autarky is: 
2
2
2
2
)()(max F
Q
Q
b
Qa
FQCQQp
Q











 
  
Hence, the domestic firm‟s monopoly equilibrium price-output combination will be: 
          
2
M aQ
b
 
  
 
,  
( 1)
( 2)
M a bp
b b



 
The maximum profit of the domestic firm is: 
2
auturky 2
2 ( 2)
a
F
b b
  

 
However, in the post-trade scenario, the domestic firm can no longer charge the monopoly 
price as it faces competition from the foreign firm. As a result, the domestic firms lobby to 
                                                          
6
 Identical Products that are alike in all respects or in the absence of such a product, another product which 
although not alike in all respects, has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under 
consideration. For details see, Article 2.6 of the AD agreement of GATT (1994).  
7
 In autarky, the domestic firm also faces the same market demand function.
 
We assume that firm 2 does not 
face any capacity constraint. 
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their government authorities for protection. One such policy choice by the domestic 
government is AD initiation. Considering the plausible actions of both the foreign and 
domestic firm, we compute and compare the optimal price, output and profit conditions under 
each of the following strategy combinations. 
Case I: Exports Below Normal Value with No AD Initiation 
With trade, the domestic firm would accept the price „p‟ (as parameter) set by the foreign 
firm, and choose its output level.
8
  
The post-trade profit maximization problem for the domestic firm can be written as: 
 
 
The follower (Firm 2) would choose an output level where price is equal to its marginal cost. 
With p  as the (parametric) prevailing price in the domestic market, the foreign firm would 
be serving the residual demand.   
 
The profit maximization problem of the foreign firm is: 
 
111
1
1
11
max
1
Fqq
b
q
b
a
q









 
 
The trade equilibrium price-output combinations for the two firms are: 
* * *
1 2
( 1) ( 1)
;   
2 2( 1)
a b a b
q q p
b
    
    

                               
The profit of the two concerned firms will be: 
     
2 2
* *
1 1 2 22
{ ( 1)} { ( 1)}
;
4( 1) 8( 1)
a b a b
F F
b b
 
 
   
    
   
In order to highlight the sustained „material injury‟ and argue in favour of the AD policy we 
compare the pre-trade optimal price, output and profit level with the corresponding trade 
equilibrium price, output and profit values for the domestic firm. See, Table 1 in which we 
consider some hypothetical values for a, b and .  
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 „p‟ being the export price which is below „normal value‟. 
2
2
2
22
2
max
2
F
q
pq
q

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Table 1: Analysis of The Model Based on Hypothetical Values 
Values Autarky Post-Trade Material Injury 
6.0
1.0
100




b
a
 
52.23809
61.47
8.523
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
73.1046,82.2242
,75.45,67.49
75.45
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 3.9% and 
95.6% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
4.0
2.0
100




b
a
 
63.11363
45.45
72.272
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
40.876,38.2063
,87.41,76.49
87.41
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 7.87% and 
92.28% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
4.0
3.0
100




b
a
 
37.7246
47.43
40.188
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
35.747,12.1903
,66.38,74.49
66.38
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 11.06% and 
89.68% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
8.0
4.0
100




b
a
 
54.5208
67.41
83.145
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
96.651,72.1745
,11.36,44.49
11.36
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 13.34% and 
87.48% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
5.0
5.0
100




b
a
 
4000
40
120
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
80.563,42.1641
,58.33,62.49
58.33
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 16.05% and 
85.9% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
1
1
100




b
a
 
67.16666
33.33
67.66
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
125.325,1200
,5.25,49
5.25
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 23.49% and 
80.49% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
2
2
100




b
a
 
625
25
5.37
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
11.156,49.736
,67.17,47
67.17
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 29.32% and 
75.02% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
3
3
100




b
a
 
33.333
20
67.26
autarky
autarky
autarky



Q
p
 
98,484
,14,44
14
*
2
*
1
*
2
*
1
*




qq
p
 
Firm 2 suffers 30% and 
70.59% decline in output 
share and profit levels, 
respectively. 
 
Had the domestic firm, accepted the prevailing export price, it would not have been able to 
sustain the losses, as it can nowhere reach the price level that the foreign firm charge. We 
argue that an AD duty would yield the best result for the domestic firm as the magnitude of 
„material injury‟ sustained to the domestic firm (Firm 2) varies with the elasticity of demand 
and it is case specific. 
 
9 
 
Also, it is found that unlike orthodox protectionist measures, the rate of an AD duty can be 
varied depending upon the magnitude of „material injury‟. Further, one can say from fig. 3 
that beyond the profit maximizing price of firm 1 (the foreign firm), imposition of an AD 
duty would cause the export price to increase. This will lead to a decline in profits of foreign 
firm. 
 
Figure 3: Profit Curve of the Foreign Firm 
 
Case II: Exports Below Normal Value with Affirmative AD Case 
We consider an ad-valorem anti-dumping duty on equilibrium price below the „normal 
value‟  *p . Domestic firm would now accept the price * 1p p tq   where 0t   is the rate of 
AD duty. Such an AD duty will raise the export price to the level of „normal value‟ and 
ensure dumping margin to be zero.
9
 Accordingly, the domestic (importing) firm would 
choose its output level (
2q ).  
The profit maximization problem of the domestic firm now becomes: 
2
2
2
22~ 2
~
~~~max
2
F
q
qp
q
  
 
Since the foreign firm would operate in the domestic market based upon the residual demand, 
the profit maximization problem for the foreign firm would be 
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 Dumping margin is defined as the difference between „normal value‟ minus export price. 
1
1 1 1 1 1
( 1)
max
1 1q
a bt t
q q q F
b b
 
  
    
  
   
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Trade equilibrium price-output combination with the AD duty prevailing in the home market 
for the two firms would be: 
)1(2
)1(~*
1



tbt
ba
q

  and 
                         
)~(
)1(2
)1(
)1(2
)1(~ **
2 p
tbt
ba
t
b
ba
q 













 
Compared to Case I, a commitment to an anti-dumping policy increases domestic output, 
decreases foreign exports, and increases the market price. 
Case III: Exports Above Normal Value with Counterfeit AD Case 
When exports are made above „normal value‟, the prevailing price in the home market would 
be
*
1
ˆ   and  p p tq    . As the domestic firm does not get to know initially whether the 
imports are above or below the „normal value‟ before filing an AD investigation, the AD case 
is likely to be a counterfeit one. Under such circumstances both the firms would bear an 
unnecessary cost of fighting out the AD case. In order to capture such unnecessary costs, we 
modify the initial cost functions to the followings: 
1111 )( Fqqc   and 2
2
2
22
2
)( F
q
qc 
 
where, 2,1,  iFF iii    and i  includes the monetary and non-monetary cost of a 
counterfeit AD case.
10
 
The profit maximization problem for the domestic firm is: 
2
2
2
22
ˆ 2
ˆ
ˆˆˆmax
2
F
q
qp
q
  
As earlier, again the follower would choose an output level where 2ˆˆ qp  .  
The profit maximization problem of the foreign firm would be: 
111
1
1
ˆ
ˆˆ
1
ˆ
1
ˆmax
1
Fqq
b
q
b
a
q










   
Then the trade equilibrium price-output combination for the two firms would be:
11
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 Examples of non-monetary cost are loss of goodwill, frequent visits to case hearings, time cost, among others.  
Also known as „harassment effect‟. 
11
 When exports are made above „normal value‟ and there is no counterfeit AD case, the trade equilibrium price-
output combinations  for the foreign as well as the domestic firm will be similar to that of 
*
1qˆ and 
*
2qˆ , 
respectively. However, the profit function for the two firms would not consider the monetary and non-
monetary cost of a counterfeit AD case. In other words, profit of the two firms would be larger than what these 
respective firms earn (i.e. profit) in Case III. 
11 
 
and 
2
)1)((
ˆ*
1


ba
q

)ˆ(
)1(2
)1)((
ˆ **
2 p
b
ba
q 




 
Compared to Case I and II, the foreign firm would not export above „normal value‟, as its 
trade equilibrium output falls. Thus, in order to encourage exports above „normal value‟ in 
the home market, the home country must have the ad-valorem duty: 
)1)((
*


ba
t


.  
 
In other words, *t acts as a credible threat
12
 for the foreign firm and restrict them only to 
export above „normal value‟. In the post-trade scenario the domestic firm enjoys a larger 
market share when the prevailing price in the home market (i.e., export price) is above the 
„normal value‟. Thus, we have .~ˆ *2
*
2
*
2 qqq    
 
On the contrary, when exports are made below the „normal value‟, the domestic firm enjoys 
an increment in profit with an ad valorem AD duty levied. Given the non-monetary cost 
associated with a counterfeit AD case, the domestic firm would not like to engage itself in 
such a situation. Nonetheless, when the foreign firm exports above „normal value‟, and there 
is no counterfeit AD case filed by the domestic firm, both firms(s) enjoy a higher profit share. 
 
In order to substantiate the general validity of the model, we perform the entire exercise with 
different cost specifications, such as: 
0,;)( 11
2
111   Fqqqc  and 
           0,;)( 22
2
222   Fqqqc  
 
With these new cost functions, the results do not change qualitatively. However, the new 
optimal ad-valorem AD duty is: .
)])(1([
)]1(1[*
new





ba
b
t  
Thus, a credible threat of an AD duty can potentially alter the pricing strategy of the 
exporting firm from „below‟ to „above‟ normal value and create a win-win situation for both 
the firms. 
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*t would ensure, foreign firm‟s output in Case II to be less than that in Case III. 
12 
 
2.1 Game Theoretic Exercise 
We continue with the assumption that the foreign firm has technological superiority (and 
therefore, cost advantage) in producing the „like product‟. As a result, the foreign firm has a 
choice to sell below the „normal value‟.13 In retaliation, the domestic (importing) firm can 
either initiate an anti-dumping investigation or can opt to set its price as that of leader. 
 
When the foreign firm exports below the „normal value‟, it enjoys a higher pay-off given the 
domestic firm does not retaliate but simply opt to set the same price as that of exporter. 
However, the domestic firm would not prefer to set such a price as it would be extremely 
difficult to reduce its selling price anywhere close to it. There is a good reason to believe that 
the foreign firm would have to compromise with a relatively lower pay-off when the 
domestic firm selects the strategy of initiating an AD case. Under such a circumstance, it is 
highly probable that an AD initiation by the domestic firm would get converted into an AD 
measure. Moreover, as the foreign (exporting) firm sells below the „normal value‟ it may 
have to sustain short term losses apart from incurring a significant cost of fighting out the AD 
case. 
 
On the other hand, when the foreign firm decides to sell above the „normal value‟, the 
domestic firm has a higher likelihood to set its price somewhere close to the price charged by 
the foreign firm (leader). The domestic firm knows that not only there is a high cost of being 
engaged in an counterfeit AD case; also the domestic firm can now better compete with the 
price charged by the foreign firm.
14
 In other words, when the exporting firm decides to sell 
above the „normal value‟, it would be wise for the import competing domestic firm to set its 
price around the price charged by the exporting firm over an AD initiation. Given the 
common knowledge and costs associated with AD investigation for both the players, it is 
rational for the exporting firm to sell above the „normal value‟. 
 
We consider a sequential form game. The foreign firm makes the choice first and then the 
domestic firm retaliates. As the domestic (importing) firm does not get to realize initially 
whether the imports are above or below the „normal value‟ before filing an AD investigation, 
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 The underlying assumption here is that exports made below the normal value causes „material injury‟ to the 
domestic firm(s). 
14
 Such a high cost prompts the domestic firm not to suffer from moral hazard problem. 
13 
 
we therefore, assign a singleton information set containing two decision nodes for the 
domestic firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 3: Extensive Form Game 
where    EF1: Price below Normal Value; EF2: Price above Normal Value; and                              
IF1: Initiate AD; IF2: Accept Leader’s Price. 
 
We impose the following restrictions on the pay-offs: 
Exporting firm: a < c and e < g 
Importing firm: b > d and f < h  
 
When the exports are made below the „normal value‟ and subsequently the domestic 
(importing) firm initiates an AD procedure (IF1), the foreign (exporting) firm would earn a 
lower profit than what it would earn if the domestic firm accepts the price set by the foreign 
firm (IF2); i.e., a < c.  This is because the foreign firm has high probability to face an AD 
measure (which may be very costly) when selling below the „normal value‟. On the same 
note, an AD initiation by the domestic (importing) firm would yield it a higher pay-off (i.e., b 
> d) as there is a high probability of recovering the sustained „material injury‟ through the 
AD measure. 
 
When the foreign (exporting) firm sells above the „normal value‟ (EF2), an AD initiation by 
the importing firm would yield a lower pay-off for both the firms (i.e., e < g and f < h). 
Despite selling above the „normal value‟ if the domestic (importing) firm initiates an anti-
dumping case against its foreign counterpart, it will not only involve monetary cost of 
h 
c 
IF IF 
d 
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b 
IF2 IF1 IF2 IF1 
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fighting out the AD case but also a significant time cost as well as the opportunity cost of 
losing that particular export market till the case is resolved. Moreover, the foreign firm will 
be relatively better off if the domestic firm decides to operate upon the price set by the 
foreign (exporting) firm. Further one can say that given the optimal rate of AD duty, the 
foreign firm would like to export above „normal value‟. When exports are made above the 
„normal value‟, the domestic firm would prefer to accept the prevailing price than to initiate 
an AD case.
15
 Filing a counterfeit AD case would imply unnecessary cost to the domestic 
(importing) firm. Also, the domestic firm can now compete with prevailing export price. 
 
When the foreign firm decides to sell below the „normal value‟, it earns a lesser pay-off 
compared to what it would earn if it sold above the „normal value‟ (i.e., a < e). This is 
because of the possible retaliation by the domestic firm in terms of initiating an AD case 
against the foreign firm and therefore, imposing an AD duty on exports. As an illustration we 
represent the restrictions on the basis of some hypothetical values in fig. 4. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Pay-off Structure of Domestic and Foreign Firm 
When the exports are made below the „normal value‟ (EF1), then it is more paying for the 
domestic firm to initiate AD (IF1) as the pay-off is higher. On the other hand, when exports 
are made above the „normal value‟ (EF2), the domestic firm would accept the prevailing price 
(IF2) as the pay-off is relatively higher. Therefore, the strategy combination (EF2- IF2) is the 
unique Nash equilibrium. 
                                                          
15
 We assume here that exports above normal value do not necessarily cause any „material injury‟ to the 
domestic firm. 
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No matter what the domestic firm plays, selling above the „normal value‟ is clearly a 
preferred strategy for the foreign firm. As a result, the exporting firm would not sell below 
the „normal value‟ and the importing firm would find IF2 to be its dominant strategy. Thus, 
the credible threat of an anti-dumping enforcement alters the strategy choice of the exporting 
firm and allows for the conduct of free and fair trade. 
 
3. Summing Up 
How would a domestic (importing) firm respond to the case of dumping? This paper analyzed 
the magnitude of sustained „material injury‟ and a possible retaliation strategy by the firm(s) 
in terms of a price-leadership model. The level of AD duty varies with „material injury‟ and 
ensures export price to rise. A strategically chosen AD duty by the government of an 
importing country over the profit-maximizing price of the foreign (exporting) firm will 
decrease its profit.  
 
The domestic firm faces a trade-off in choosing alternative strategies (i.e., anti-dumping 
initiations vis-à-vis a price war). The (credible) threat of the ad-valorem anti-dumping duty 
avoids exports below „normal value‟ by the foreign firm. An anti-dumping duty acts as an ex-
ante threat to the exporters and thus changes the equilibrium outcome. The threat of an anti-
dumping enforcement might not be a permanent one but it would manage to alter the original 
intentions of the exporting firm (i.e. predatory pricing).  
 
For instance, data on AD initiations reveal that around 62 per cent of AD initiations get 
converted to AD measures for the new users. It may be argued that owing to a high success 
rate, unfair trade practices pertaining to selling below the „normal value‟ have been reduced 
and thus a decline in AD activities in recent times. Nonetheless, we still find that anti-
dumping initiations are used much more than any other protectionist measures in lieu of 
declining orthodox trade protectionist measures (e.g., tariff barrier or a binding constraint of 
import quota).  
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